wind and water erosion and to minimize ground water contamination. This alternative would also likely include land use restrictions and/or other institutional controls, to prevent or reduce potential intrusion into the waste, to monitor the long-term effectiveness of the disposal, and to take mitigative measures as necessary to protect the public and environment.

b. With off site slag only—This alternative is similar to Alternative 1.a, with the addition of approximately 10,000 yd ³ of off site slag to the West Pile before stabilization and capping.

c. With soils and sediments only— This alternative is similar to Alternative 1.a, with the addition of approximately 33,500 yd³ of chemically contaminated soils and sediments to the West Pile before stabilization and capping.

d. With off site slag, soils, and sediments—This alternative is similar to Alternative 1.b, with the addition of approximately 33,500 yd ³ of chemically contaminated soils and sediments to the West Pile before stabilization and

capping.

- 2. Off site disposal—Radioactive contamination would be exhumed from the site and disposed of off site at a licensed low-level waste disposal facility. Radioactive contamination onsite would be reduced down to levels that NRC presently considers acceptable for release for unrestricted use (e.g., 10 picoCuries per gram (pCi/g) total uranium (with decay products) and 10 pCi/g thorium-232 and thorium-228 and other criteria such as exposure rate and radon concentrations).
- 3. Onsite separation processing with off site disposal—Radioactive contamination would be processed using physical or chemical methods to separate more highly concentrated contamination from lower concentrations that could be stabilized onsite. Higher concentration wastes would be sent off site to a licensed disposal facility. Radioactive contamination onsite would be reduced down to levels that NRC presently considers acceptable for release for unrestricted use.
- 4. Onsite dilution and disposal— Existing radioactive contamination would be blended with clean fill, to reduce average concentrations of uranium and thorium to levels that NRC presently considers acceptable for release for unrestricted use. Diluted contamination would then be graded onsite and released for unrestricted use.
- 5. No action—Radioactive contamination would be abandoned in its present configuration without any additional processing or stabilization. This alternative does not consider any

protective measures, such as land use restrictions or other institutional controls, that might mitigate or prevent intrusion into the waste or long-term release and transport of contamination in the environment. (The no-action alternative is only included for the purpose of comparison with the other alternatives.)

The EIS will evaluate these alternative decommissioning approaches with respect to: (1) The incremental impact to workers, members of the public, and the environment both radiological and non-radiological resulting from each alternative; and (2) the costs associated with each alternative. The EIS will also include a comparative evaluation of the decommissioning approaches based on the associated impacts and costs. The evaluation is described in great detail in the November 28, 1993, **Federal Register** notice (58 FR 62384).

EIS Development Schedule

NRC intends to prepare and issue for public comment a draft EIS in March 1996. The comment period would be for 90 days. The final EIS is scheduled for publication in January 1997. This schedule has been delayed because information resulting from the RI/FS is needed to conduct the EIS analyses. Further delays may occur if needed information is not submitted in a timely manner. Subsequent to completion of the final EIS, the NRC would review and act on a license amendment from the licensee requesting authorization for decommissioning the site, including the decommissioning plan as required in 10 CFR 40.42(d). Depending on the resolution of the licensee's financial restructuring under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code, the NRC may terminate or postpone development of the EIS.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day of August 1995.

For the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Michael F. Weber,

Chief, Low-Level Waste and Decommissioning Projects Branch, Division of Waste Management, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

[FR Doc. 95–20639 Filed 8–18–95; 8:45 am]

Advisory Committee on the Medical Uses of Isotopes: Meeting Notice

AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission will convene a

subcommittee meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Medical Uses of Isotopes (ACMUI) on September 17, 18, and 29, 1995. The subject of the subcommittee meeting is to discuss draft licensing guidance of certain types of medical use to be incorporated into Regulatory Guide 10.8, "Guide for the Preparation of Applications for Medical Use Programs." The schedule for discussion of the guidance is as follows:

- (1) Mobile nuclear medicine: morning of September 27, 1995;
- (2) Radioactive drug therapy: afternoon of September 27, 1995;

(3) Remote afterloading

brachytherapy: September 28, 1995; and

(4) Manual brachytherapy, followed by teletherapy and gamma stereotactic radiosurgery: September 29, 1995. DATES: The meeting will begin at 8 a.m., on September 27, 28, and 29, 1995. ADDRESSES: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Room T2B1, Rockville, MD 20852–2738.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Josephine M. Piccone, Ph.D., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, MS T8F5, Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301) 415–7270.

For administrative information, contract Torre Taylor at (301) 415–7900.

Conduct of the Meetings

1. The staff is seeking ACMUI input on draft medical use licensing guidance currently under development. The ACMUI subcommittee does not intend to accept comments form members of the public during the subcommittee meeting, because of the amount of material to be discussed in a relatively short timeframe. The proposed licensing guidance is scheduled to be published for public comment in early 1996.

2. The transcripts of the subcommittee meeting will be available for inspection, and copying, for a fee, at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW., Lower Level, Washington, DC 20555, (202) 634–3273, on or about October 20, 1995.

3. Seating for the public will be on a first-come, first-served basis.

This meeting will be held in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (primarily Section 161a); the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App); and the Commission's regulations in Title 10, U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Part 7.

Dated: August 15, 1995.

Andrew L. Bates,

Advisory Committee Management Officer. [FR Doc. 95–20640 Filed 8–18–95; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

[Docket No. 50-298]

Nebraska Public Power District (Cooper Nuclear Station); Revocation of Exemption

Ι

Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD or the licensee) is the holder of Facility Operating License No. DPR-46, which authorizes operation of the Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) at power levels not in excess of 2381 megawatts thermal. The facility consists of a boiling water reactor at the licensee's site in Nemaha County, Nebraska. The operating license provides, among other things, that CNS is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect.

II

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, § 50.48, 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, Criterion 3, and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, establish requirements and design criteria for fire protection at operating nuclear power plants. Section III.G of Appendix R specifies the required fire protection features necessary to assure that safe shutdown of the plant can be achieved in the event of a postulated fire. On September 21, 1983, the NRC granted several exemptions to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, for CNS. One of the exemptions applied specifically to the Critical Switchgear Rooms 1F and 1G on the 932 foot elevation of the reactor building. These areas were considered to not meet the requirements of Section III.G. of Appendix R, because 3-hour rated fire barriers were not provided in the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) ducts where they penetrate three-hour rated fire walls. The licensee had provided 11/2-hour rated dampers in the ductwork and had committed to upgrade one electrical bus duct penetration through the east wall of Critical Switchgear Room 1G and through the common wall between the two switchgear rooms to a 3-hour rating. The exemption was granted by the staff, based on the low combustible loading in the area, the automatic detection system provided, and the commitment to upgrade the electrical bus duct penetration seals to 3-hour rated barriers.

By letter dated December 16, 1994, the Nebraska Public Power District submitted revised commitments for the fire protection program at CNS. In that letter, the licensee also proposed to withdraw the exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50, appendix R, for the critical switchgear

rooms on the 932 foot elevation of the reactor building.

III

The NRC staff determines the acceptability of existing fire area boundaries based on information provided in the Appendix A Fire Hazards Analysis for that facility, the associated NRC fire protection safety evaluation (SE), and the positions documented in NRC Generic Letter (GL) 86–10, "Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements."

Generic Letter 86–10 provides NRC staff interpretations and answers to specific questions regarding implementation of Appendix R requirements, including requirements for review of previously reviewed and approved fire boundaries. The GL identifies that, if a fire area boundary was described as a rated barrier in the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) for that plant, and was evaluated and accepted in an NRC SE, the fire area boundary need not be reviewed as part of the reanalysis for compliance with Section III.G of Appendix R. However, The GL guidance also provides that if all penetrations in the previously reviewed fire boundaries were not explicitly addressed in the aforementioned analyses, an evaluation of those penetrations should be performed to confirm that the boundary will withstand the hazards to which it could be exposed in compliance with Appendix R.

The subject fire area boundary was identified as a rated fire barrier in the Appendix A FHA for CNS submitted on March 31, 1977. The existing configuration of the barrier was accepted by the NRC staff in its fire protection SE on May 23, 1979, based on certain commitments that were subsequently met. However, the electrical bus duct penetrations through the east wall of Critical Switchgear Room 1G and through the common wall between the two switchgear rooms were not specifically identified and analyzed in the 1977 FHA; therefore, the licensee performed a separate evaluation to demonstrate that the fire boundary is capable of withstanding the hazards to which it could be exposed, consistent with the guidance of GL 86-10.

In NPPD's December 16, 1994, submittal, the licensee stated that the fire area boundary separating the redundant critical switchgear rooms on the 932 foot elevation of the reactor building has been analyzed in accordance with the guidance of Appendix A to NRC Branch Technical Position 9.5–1, 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R and GL 86–10. The

engineering evaluations performed by the licensee conclude that the barrier and its penetrations can withstand the hazards to which they could be exposed and therefore, provide adequate protection for redundant safe shutdown systems located in the critical switchgear rooms on opposite sides of the barrier. On the basis of these evaluations, the licensee has concluded that the existing fire boundary configuration is acceptable and that the electrical bus duct penetrations do not need to be upgraded to a 3-hour rating.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's justification for withdrawal of the exemption. The staff finds that the licensee has conformed with the applicable staff positions identified in GL 86–10 regarding the evaluation of previously accepted fire area boundaries for compliance with Appendix R and concludes that the previously approved exemption is not needed.

IV

Accordingly, the Commission has determined that the specific exemption from 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G., granted on September 21, 1983, for the fire area boundaries for Critical Switchgear Rooms 1F and 1G is hereby revoked in that it is no longer necessary.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the revoking of this exemption will have no significant effect on the quality of the human environment (60 FR 41907). This revocation of exemption is effective upon issuance.

Dated at Rockville, MD, this 14th day of August 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. **Jack W. Roe**,

Director, Division of Reactor Projects III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–20638 Filed 8–18–95; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Notice of Request for Review of the Revised Information Collection, SF 3106 and SF 3106A

AGENCY: Office of Personnel

Management. **ACTION:** Notice.

SUMMARY: In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (title 44, U.S. Code, chapter 35), this notice announces a request for review of a revised information collection. Standard Forms 3106 and 3106A are used by former Federal employees who